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I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States today, it is estimated that between five and twenty-
five percent of motorists lack any form of automobile insurance coverage.!
This is true despite the fact that forty-two states, including the District of
Columbia, require every individual who registers a motor vehicle to show
proof of automobile liability insurance at or beyond a minimal threshold
amount.2 In order to deal with this situation, most states currently require
some sort of uninsured motorist (UM) coverage to be offered to purchasers
of automobile insurance.3 Typically, uninsured motorist insurance coverage
effectively allows an insured motorist to be compensated for injuries
resulting from an automobile accident with individuals who are not insured.4
Ever since insurance companies began offering uninsured motorist
insurance policies, there has been a tremendous amount of litigation relating
to disputes over policy coverage issues and compensation payments made to
uninsured motorist policyholders who have been in automobile accidents
with noninsured drivers.5 Many insurance companies have elected to use the
* 720 N.E.2d 1052 (111. 1999).
1 See ALAN I. WIDISS, UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE
§ 1.12, at 17 (2d ed. 1999). Looking at criteria in specific states, in Thxas, for example, it
is estimated that nearly 25 percent of drivers are uninsured. However, Illinois, which
recently adopted a survey program to crack down on uninsured drivers, has seen its
uninsured motorist rate fall from 17 percent in 1988 to 4 percent in 1998. See Jim
Vertuno, Senate OK's Surveys to Catch Uninsured Drivers (visited Apr. 16, 2000)
<http:lwww.caller.comlautoconv/newstexmex99/newstexmex316.html>. Further, due to
a newly implemented computer database system, Utah has seen its uninsured motorist
rate fall from 322,898 drivers (23 percent) in 1994 to 155,474 drivers (10.4 percent) in
1999. See Zack Van Eyck, Uninsured Drivers' Database Wins Favor: Lawbreakers Drop
from 23% to 10% in 4 Years (visited April 16, 2000) <http://www.insure-rite.com
/articles/April24-99.htm>.
2 See ROBERT H. JERRY IL UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 849 (1996). Typically,
these are referred to as "financial responsibility laws." See id.
3 See id. at 866 (citing ALAN I. WIDISS, UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST
INSURANCE § 2.1, at 21 (1995)). In fact, 49 states now require UM coverage to be offered,
and approximately 17 states mandate by statute that LIM insurance be sold with general
liability insurance policies. See id.
4 See MARGARET C. JASPER, INSURANCE LAW 25 (1998). Normally, although each
states' UM provisions vary, most statutory schemes provide for a minimal amount in
which an individual is to be compensated for bodily injuries in the unlikely event of an
accident with an uninsured motorist. See JERRY, supra note 2, at 866.
5 See JAMES B. BOSKEY Er AL., THE AmERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION
INSURANCE MANUAL 205 (1993).
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alternative dispute resolution (ADR) method of arbitration to resolve disputes
arising out of uninsured motorist policies.6 However, the use of arbitration to
resolve disputes arising out of uninsured motorist insurance policies has
spawned recently a substantial number of new disputes relating to issues
arising out of uninsured motorist arbitration provisions themselves.7
Paradoxically, arbitration, which normally is used as an alternative "dispute
resolution" tool, has turned out, at least in the uninsured motorist arena, to be
a large cause of the disputes that actually do arise.
Reed v. Farmers Insurance Group8 represents a case in which an Illinois
state statute that required automobile insurance policies to contain a
mandatory arbitration clause was challenged as against public policy and as
unconstitutional in violation of an individual's right to due process. 9 The
Illinois Supreme Court, in a four to three decision, declared that the
arbitration clause was not against public policy and held that the state statute,
which authorized such a clause, was not repugnant to the due process clauses
of the llinois or Federal constitution. 10
II. BACKGROUND, FACTS, AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF REED V.
FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP
On April 1, 1995, the plaintiff, Julie Reed, was injured in an automobile
accident when a vehicle that had collided with another vehicle in an
intersection hit her car." It was alleged that the driver of the first vehicle,
6 See id. at 209. The use of the ADR method of arbitration generally is seen as a way
to settle disputes more advantageously and efficiently than the traditional judicial
process. See id. Some common advantages of arbitration over normal court adjudication
include the following: (1) arbitration is less expensive and allows for speedier resolution
of a case; (2) parties have the ability to select their own decisionmaker, or arbitrator; (3)
an arbitration proceeding is typically a "private forum," allowing parties more
confidentiality; (4) parties can craft their own rules for the proceeding, making them as
informal or simple as they wish; (5) the decision of the arbitrator is generally final and
binding, thus bringing closure to a case. See STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 234 (1999). There does
exist the argument, however, that insurance companies have chosen to use arbitration to
resolve UM policy disputes primarily for preventing conflicts of interests between
themselves and their insureds arising out of liability concerns. See BOSKEY ET AL., supra
note 5, at 209-10.
7 See BOSKEY ET AL., supra note 5, at 206
8 720 N.E.2d 1052 (Ill. 1999).
9 See Illinois Upholds Binding Arbitration Scheme for Uninsured Motorist Coverage
Disputes, U.S. L. WEEK, Nov. 2, 1999, at 1251.
10 See id.
11 See Reed, 720 N.E.2d at 1052.
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who fled the scene after the accident, had been an uninsured motorist."
Plaintiff had an uninsured motorist insurance policy with the defendant,
Farmers Insurance Group, and she sought compensation under her policy
coverage for injuries sustained due to the accident.13 Under Illinois state law,
an uninsured motorist insurance policy must contain an arbitration clause to
resolve disputes that arise pertaining to coverage and compensation issues.
14
Moreover, according to Illinois law, an arbitrator's award is binding on the
parties involved if the amount awarded is below a certain threshold amount, 15
in this case, $20,000.16 However, if the arbitrator's award were above the
minimum threshold amount, then either party would be able to challenge the
12 See id.
13 See id.
14 See id. With respect to uninsured motorist insurance policies, section 5/143a of
the Illinois state insurance law states the following:
No policy shall be renewed, delivered, or issued for delivery in this State unless it is
provided therein that any dispute with respect to the coverage and the amount of
damages shall be submitted for arbitration to the American Arbitration Association
and be subject to its rules for the conduct of arbitration hearings as to all matters
except medical opinions.
[D]isputes with respect to damages and the coverage shall be determined in the
following manner: Upon the insured requesting arbitration, each party to the dispute
shall elect an arbitrator and the 2 arbitrators so named shall select a third arbitrator.
If such arbitrators are not selected within 45 days from such request, either party
may request that the arbitration be submitted to the American Arbitration
Association.
215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN 5/143a (West 1993 & Supp. 1999).
15 See Reed, 720 N.E.2d at 1055. Section 51143a of Illinois law states that, "[a]ny
decision made by the arbitrators shall be binding for the amount of damages not
exceeding the limits for bodily injury or death set forth in Section 7-203 of the Illinois
Vehicle Code." 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN 5/143a (West 1993 & Supp. 1999).
16 See Reed, 720 N.E.2d at 2055. With respect to motor vehicle insurance policies,
Section 5/7-203 of the Illinois Vehicle Code and the Safety and Family Responsibility
Law states that:
[E]very such policy or bond is subject, if the motor vehicle accident has resulted in
bodily injury or death, to a limit, exclusive of interest and costs, of not less than
$20,000 because of bodily injury to or death of any one person in any one motor
vehicle accident and, subject to said limit for one person, to a limit of not less than
$40,00 because of bodily injury or to death of 2 or more persons in one motor
vehicle accident....
625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7-203 (West 1993).
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award by going to court.17 In this case, plaintiffs uninsured motorist
insurance policy stated the following:
If an insured person and we do not agree (1) whether the person is legally
entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured
motor vehicle, or (2) as to the amount of payment under this part, either
that person or we may demand, in writing, that the issue be determined by
arbitration. The amount of the award will be binding unless the amount of
the award for damages exceeds the minimum required limits set forth in the
Illinois Financial Responsibility Law. When we arbitrate, any decision
made by any two of the arbitrators in writing shall be binding for the
amount of damages not exceeding the minimum required limits for bodily
injury set forth in the Illinois Financial Responsibility Law and may be
entered as a judgment in a proper court. When an award exceeds those
limits, either party has a right to reject the award and to a trial on all issues
in a court of competent jurisdiction. This right must be exercised within
sixty (60) days of the award by filing suit in a court of competent
jurisdiction. In that event, costs, including attorney fees, are to be paid by
the party incurring them.'
8
In the circuit court of Tazewell County, Illinois, Ms. Reed
challenged her uninsured motorist insurance policy's arbitration
provision, which was required by Illinois statute, as unconstitutional and
sought to have the arbitration requirement declared void and
unenforceable. 9 Reed initially filed a two-count complaint against the
defendant 2° and later filed an amended complaint, alleging five counts.21
At trial, defendant moved to dismiss both counts of plaintiff's original
17 See Reed, 720 N.E.2d at 1055.
18 Reed v. Farmers Insurance Group, 685 N.E.2d 385, 387-88 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
19 See id. at 386-87.
20 Originally, Reed sought to have her insurance policy arbitration clause invalidated
and the relevant Illinois statute declared unconstitutional. Second, because of the alleged
negligent driving of the uninsured motorist, she sought to recover damages for injuries
sustained from the resulting automobile accident. See Reed, 685 N.E.2d at 386.
21 See Reed, 720 N.E.2d at 1055. In her appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court,
plaintiff alleged the following: (1) the provision in her uninsured motorist coverage that
allows parties to appeal an arbitration award in court only if it exceeds a certain amount,
but not if it is below another amount, violates public policy and is unenforceable; (2) the
arbitration clause in her uninsured motorist policy interferes with a parties' freedom to
contract with another, and is unconstitutional; (3) the Illinois statute requiring an
arbitration clause in an uninsured motorist policy violates due process and denies parties
access to the courts; (4) the arbitration statute violates Article I of the Illinois
Constitution, as it takes away a party's right to a jury trial; and (5) the statute violates
Article VI of the Illinois Constitution, as it creates a "system of fee officers." See id. at
1056-60.
[Vol. 15:3 2000]
REED V. FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP
complaint, and the circuit court granted this motion.22 Plaintiff appealed
from this decision, and the Appellate Court of Illinois reversed the
decision of the trial court, concluding that the arbitration clause
contained in her uninsured motorist coverage was unconscionable and
thus unenforceable. 23 Further, the court declared the Illinois state statute,
which required a mandatory arbitration clause,2 to be unconstitutional,
as it interfered with plaintiffs right to contract freely.2 Defendant,
Farmers Insurance Group, appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court for
review, and its petition was accepted.26
II. THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS IN REED V.
FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP
In Reed, the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the decision of the
Illinois appellate court and held that the arbitration provision, both in
defendant's insurance policy and as set forth by Illinois state statute, was not
against public policy, that it did not violate plaintiff's due process rights, and
22 See Reed, 685 N.E.2d at 386. The trial court concluded that "there was no
constitutional impediment to enforcing the statute, and that the action was not ripe for
declaratory judgment." Id.
23 See id. at 388-89. The appellate courtconcluded that "[pilaintiff had no means or
opportunity to negotiate the arbitration clause, and was unable to obtain insurance
without agreeing to the mandatory arbitration provision. It is this involuntary submission
to binding arbitration that we find offensive." Id. at 389.
24 The appellate court found disfavor with this provision and stated that
"compulsory arbitration takes away the full flexibility of the parties to choose whether to
arbitrate and the way arbitration is structured, and detracts from the stated purpose of the
statute." Id. at 391.
25 See id. at 390-91. The court, applying the rational basis test, stated that first, it
must be determined "whether the statute in question has operated as a substantial
impairment of a contractual relationship. If such impairment is found, the proper inquiry
is whether the legislative enactment represents a significant and legitimate public
purpose, and whether the means are reasonably tailored to promote that purpose." Id. at
390. The court first concluded that section 5/143a of the Illinois statute substantially
impaired plaintiff's right to bargain, as it forced her to "contract for automobile insurance
coverage pursuant to the mandatory coverage laws of the state." Id. Second, the court
concluded that the provisions of section 5/143a did not represent a proper public purpose
that was rationally related to the accomplishment of the legislature's stated goal--"to
place the policyholder injured by an uninsured motorist in the same position she would
have occupied had the uninsured motorist been minimally insured." Id. In acknowledging
the statute's purported goal, the court asked, "why 'punish' the insured by mandating
binding arbitration and taking away from the insured's right to appeal in cases of no
liability or awards below the minimum financial responsibility limits?" Id. at 391.
26 See Reed, 720 N.E.2d at 1052.
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that it was thus constitutional. 27 In arriving at its decision, the court first
addressed plaintiff s primary argument, contained in her first count.
In her first count, Reed alleged that the arbitration clause contained in
her uninsured motorist policy, which was mandated by Illinois law, violated
public policy and was
therefore unenforceable. 28 At the heart of plaintiffs argument was her
claim that the arbitration clause favored the insurance company over the
policyholder, as it forced the insured to accept a low award, while it allowed
the insurer to unilaterally reject a high award and seek review in a court of
law.29 The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed with plaintiffs contentions for
the primary reason that "the arbitration provision that appears in the
plaintiff s insurance contract is already an expression of public
policy and represents the legislature's consideration of the question."30
Here, the court looked specifically to its own precedent to come to this
determination.3'
The plaintiffs second count alleged that the arbitration clause mandated
by the state statute interfered with her constitutional freedom to contract
because it required that the clause be part of her insurance policy and
27 See id. at 1058.
28 See id. at 1056.
29 See id.
3 0 Id. at 1057. In her complaint, plaintiff cited numerous cases that found similar
arbitration provisions to have been in violation of public policy. See id. (stating that the
plaintiff cited the following cases in support of her position: Mendes v. Automobile
Insurance Co., 563 A.2d 695 (Conn. 1989); Worldwide Insurance Group v. Klopp, 603
A.2d 788 (Del. 1992); Schmidt v. Midwest Family Mutual Insurance Co., 426 N.W.2d
870 (Minn. 1988); Schaefer v. Allstate Insurance Co., 590 N.E.2d 1242 (Ohio 1992);
Pepin v. American Universal Insurance Co., 540 A.2d 21 (R.I. 1988)). The Illinois
Supreme Court acknowledged these decisions, but distinguished Reed from plaintiffs
cited cases on the basis that, in those cases, the courts did not deal with any statutory
provisions that already had been in place requiring arbitration clauses in uninsured
motorist policies. See Reed, 720 N.E.2d at 1057. The Reed court expressed that "in the
present case, in contrast, the legislature has determined that uninsured motorist coverage
must contain this provision, and section 143a of the Insurance Code accordingly requires
its presence in automobile policies." Id.
31 In Collins v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 83 N.E. 542 (Ill. 1907), the Illinois
Supreme Court declared that:
When the legislature has declared, by law, the public policy of the State, the judicial
department must remain silent, and if a modification or change in such policy is
desired the law-making department must be applied to, and not the judiciary, whose
function is to declare the law but not to make it.
Reed, 720 N.E.2d at 1057 (quoting Collins, 83 N.E. at 544).
[Vol. 15:3 2000]
REED V. FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP
therefore violated her due process rights.32 The Illinois Supreme Court, in
declaring that "legislation enjoys a strong presumption of constitutionality, 33
determined that the arbitration provision in question, both of the insurance
policy and the statute, was rationally related to a legitimate government
interest and therefore did not violate plaintiff's due process rights.34
Here, the Reed court explained that the main purpose of section 5/143a
was to provide an insured driver who had been injured by an unirisured driver
at least minimum insurance coverage.35 Further, the court found that in
adopting Section 5/143a, the Illinois legislature could have determined that
litigation costs would be lessened and that cases would get resolved in a
speedier and more efficient fashion if a mandate was imposed requiring
binding arbitration on parties, at least for awards under the $20,000 threshold
amount.36 Certainly, in this situation, the Supreme Court of Illinois felt that
the statutory arbitration provision was rationally related to attaining those
legislative goals.37
With respect to plaintiff's third count, she alleged that the Illinois state
insurance arbitration statute violated her due process and denied "her
unfettered access to the courts." 38 Again, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected
32 See id. at 1057-58. The court explained that both the parties and the appellate
court were not clear about the correct constitutional right at hand. The court examined the
distinction between rights guaranteed under the contract and due process clauses of the
federal and Illinois Constitutions. The court did state, however, that the contract clause of
the U.S. Constitution (See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10) did not apply here because that
provision only prohibits state actions that "impair the obligation of pre-existing
contracts." See Reed, 720 N.E. 2d at 1058. Here, the court explained, "a statute cannot be
said to impair a contract that did not exist when the statute was enacted." Id.
33 Reed, 720 N.E. 2d at 1058. The court later determined that the plaintiff did not
overcome this strong legislative presumption in her argument. See id. at 1059.
34 See id. at 1058-59. The court stated with certainty that "economic legislation
satisfies the requirements of due process if it is rationally related to a legitimate
government interest." Id. at 1058. The court went on to say that in order to determine
whether the statute in question impeded plaintiff's freedom to contract, it must be
determined whether the arbitration clause "is rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose." Id. The court further explained that this is the only standard that
need be applied. There does not have to be a showing that the method chosen by the
legislature "constitutes the best or most efficient means of dealing with the problem at
hand." Id. at 1058.
35 See id. at 1058 (citing Luechtefeld v. Allstate Ins. Co., 656 N.E.2d 1058 (111.
1995); Hoglund v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 592 N.E.2d 1031 (Ill. 1992)).
36 See id.
37 See id.
38 Id. at 1059.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
this argument, and cited a United States Supreme Court case 39 in support of
its conclusion that the arbitration statute did not abridge any of plaintiff's
constitutional rights. The Illinois Supreme Court found that the narrow range
of issues4° covered by section 5/143a of the state insurance law was nearly
identical to that covered under the statute in Glidden, and thus, were
41constitutional in this situation.
In her fourth count, plaintiff asserted that the Illinois state arbitration
statute violated her constitutional right to a jury trial as guaranteed by the
Illinois State constitution.42 Looking to its own precedent, the Illinois
Supreme Court concluded that in the present case, plaintiff had no protection
because the right to a jury trial under the Illinois Constitution "is limited only
to actions existing at common law."43 Here, the court found that under the
common law, there did not exist a remedy for plaintiffs current underlying
claim (uninsured-motorist coverage)."4 Instead, uninsured motorist insurance
39 In its analysis, the Illinois Supreme Court cited Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire
Insurance Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151 (1931). See Reed, 720 N.E. 2d at 1059 (citing
Glidden, 284 U.S. at 151). In this case, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld a
similar arbitration provision with respect to disputes that arise relating to losses covered
under fire insurance policies mandated by Minnesota law. See Glidden, 284 U.S. at 163.
40 The two issues the court alluded to included (a) whether an insured is legally
entitled to recover damages from an uninsured motorist and (b) the amount of payment
that is due to the insured. See Reed, 720 N.E. 2d at 1059.
41 See Reed, 720 N.E.2d at 1059-60. The court explained that the Illinois insurance
statute, "which requires arbitration of uninsured-motorist, claims and makes arbitral
awards below $20,000 binding, does not impinge on a fundamental right or create a
suspect or quasi-suspect classification, and therefore it will survive challenge on these
grounds if it is rationally related to a legitimate government interest." Id. at 1060.
42 See id. In her argument, plaintiff cited Grace v. Howlett, 283 N.E.2d 474 (Ill.
1972). In Grace, the Illinois Supreme Court determined that a statute requiring the
arbitration of automobile injury cases in counties containing under 200,000 people and in
other counties for accidents in which claimed losses were under $3,000 violated the right
to a jury trial under the Illinois Constitution. See Reed, 720 N.E.2d at 1060. The Reed
court distinguished Grace from the one at hand and asserted that "the action at issue in
Grace represented a common law claim for personal injuries arising from a motor vehicle
accident." Id. On the other hand, in Reed, the court explained that there did not exist at
common law a remedy for claims relating to uninsured motorist coverage. See id.
43 See Reed, 720 N.E. 2d at 1060. The court stated that "[in Illinois, the right to a
jury trial does not attach to every action at law. Instead, such right only attaches in those
actions where such right existed under the English common law at the time the
constitution was adopted." Id. (quoting Martin v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 643 N.E.2d
734 (Ill. 1994)).
44See id.
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was a scheme that was only recently promulgated by the legislature and not
by the common law.45
In plaintiff's fifth and final count, she argued that the state arbitration
statute created "a system of fee officers, in violation of Article VI, section
14, of the Illinois Constitution."' 6 Here, the plaintiff cited to the court's
decision in Grace, which held that a similar arbitration statute violated
Article VI, section 14 of the Illinois Constitution.4 7 However, the Reed court
distinguished the Grace statute from the one at hand48 and pronounced that
the current arbitration statute did not violate the Illinois Constitution's clause
against fee officers in the judicial system.49
IV. ANALYSIS: THE ARBITRABILITY OF DISPUTES IN THE
UNINSURED MOTORIST ARENA
In Illinois, it is settled, at least for now, that such state-authorized
arbitration insurance provisions, as outlined in Reed, are permissible and are
within constitutional bounds. However, the question that now has to be asked
is: Just how well settled are such provisions? 50 In Reed, the dissent made the
argument that in fact, the arbitration provision of section 5/143 of the Illinois
insurance statute was not "rationally related to a legitimate government
purpose.',51 Further, the dissent argued that a majority of courts52 have found
4 5 See id. The Supreme Court of Illinois asserted that "[t]he state constitutional
guarantee of ajury trial was not intended to guarantee trial by jury in special or statutory
proceedings unknown to the common law." Id.
46 Id. at 1060-61. This provision of the Illinois Constitution states: "There shall be
no fee officers in the judicial system." Id. at 1061; see also ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 14.
47 See Reed, 720 N.E. 2d at 1060-61.
48 The Reed court found that in Grace, the statute in question specifically required
that in an automobile injury case, an arbitration award "'must be entered by the Court in
its record of judgements, and has the effect of a judgment upon the parties unless
reversed upon appeal."' Id. at 1061 (quoting Grace, 283 N.E.2d at 474). In Reed, the
court explained, the arbitration statute imposed no such requirement. See id.
49 See id. The court maintained that "the form of recovery involved in this case is a
special remedy devised by the legislature and is subject to only limited judicial review,
and we do not believe that arbitrators handling such claims can be said to become 'fee
officers in the judicial system."' Id.
50 As outlined earlier, the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court was just four to
three. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
51 Reed, 720 N.E.2d at 1062 (Bilandic, J., dissenting). The dissent explained that:
The purpose of section 143a is to provide at least minimum coverage to an insured
who has been injured by an uninsured motorist. The arbitration clause is not
rationally related to this purpose. Making awards below $20,00 binding on the
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that such an arbitration provision that mandates a binding settlement on
parties for less than a certain amount but not for a larger amount unfairly
favors "insurers to the detriment of their insureds."
53
As outlined earlier, in coming to its decision, the Illinois Supreme Court
in Reed relied, in part, on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Hardware
Dealers' Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Glidden.4 In Glidden, the Supreme
Court of the United States considered whether a Minnesota statute 5 that
required an arbitration clause in fire insurance policies for resolving disputes
relating to losses infringed on the rights protected by the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.5 6 In concluding that the Minnesota statute did not impinge on
insured has no relation to providing minimum insurance coverage to individuals
injured by uninsured motorists.
Id. (Bilandic, J., dissenting). Further, the dissent in Reed stated that:
The majority states that the legislature could have concluded that mandatory binding
arbitration for "smaller claims" would help reduce litigation costs and would
promote a speedy resolution of cases involving smaller claims. I disagree. As
written, the arbitration clause does not eliminate only smaller claims from further
litigation. The arbitration clause is not limited to those cases where a plaintiff seeks
a smaller award. Rather, it requires arbitration in all cases, and then precludes a trial
for a plaintiff who sought a higher award and who may have received an erroneous
determination from the arbitrator.
Id. (Bilandic, J., dissenting).
52 See, e.g., O'Neill v. Berkshire Mut. Ins. Co., 786 F. Supp. 397 (D. Vt. 1992);
Mendes v. Auto. Ins. Co., 563 A.2d 695 (Conn. 1989); Worldwide Ins. Group v. Klopp,
603 A.2d 788 (Del. 1992); Hanover Ins. Co. v. Losquadro, 600 N.Y.S.2d 419 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1993).
53 Reed, 720 N.E.2d at 1062 (Bilandic, J., dissenting). The dissent referred to the
majority opinion of the Delaware Supreme Court:
Under the present policy language both parties are bound by a low award which an
insurance company is unlikely to appeal. While high awards may be appealed by
either party, common experience suggests that it is unlikely than an insured would
appeal such an award. It is the insurer who, generally, would be dissatisfied with a
high award. The policy provision thus presents an 'escape hatch' to the insurer for
avoidance of high arbitration awards, whether or not the award was fair and
reasonable. However, the insured, who would tend to be dissatisfied with a low
award, is barred from appealing such an award, i.e., an award under financial
responsibility limits.
Id. (Bilandic, J., dissenting).
54 284 U.S. 151 (1931).
55 The Reed court determined that the statute in question in Glidden was similar to
the one at issue in Reed. See Reed, 720 N.E.2d at 1059.
56 See id. (citing Glidden, 284 U.S. at 159-60).
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the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment,57 the U.S. Supreme
Court also asserted that the rights of parties to contract freely with each other
are not absolute and may be restricted by reasonable legislative means.5
Two other cases to which the Reed court cited in its opinion are Roe v.
Amica Mutual Insurance Co.59 and Cohen v. Allstate Insurance Co. 60 In Roe,
the Supreme Court of Florida considered a similar insurance arbitration
provision to the one that was at issue in Reed.6' Here, pursuant to provisions
of the insurance policy, both parties (the insured and the insurer) agreed to
arbitrate disputes arising out of claims, with either party being able to
unilaterally demand a jury trial if a particular arbitration award exceeded
$10,000.62 However, in this situation, the state statute at issue did not
mandate arbitration, as was the case in Reed. Instead, the parties here (insurer
57 The U. S. Supreme Court announced:
Granted, as we hold now, that the state, in the present circumstances, has power to
prescribe a summary method of ascertaining the amount of loss, the requirements of
the Fourteenth Amendment, so far as now invoked, are satisfied if the substitute
remedy is substantial and sufficient. We cannot say that the determination by
arbitrators, chosen as provided by the present statute, of the single issue of the
amount of loss under a fire insurance policy, reserving all other issues for trial in
court, does not afford such a remedy, or that in this respect it falls short of due
process, more than the provisions of state workman's compensation. laws for
establishing the amount of compensation by a commission, or the appraisal by a
commissioner of the value of property taken or destroyed by the public, made
controlling by condemnation statutes, or findings of facts by boards or commissions
which, by various statutes, are made conclusive upon the courts, if supported by
evidence.
Glidden, 284 U.S. at 159-60.
58 The U.S. Supreme Court explained:
The right to make contracts embraced in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment is not unlimited. Liberty implies only freedom from
arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable regulations and prohibitions
imposed in the interests of the community. Hence, legislation otherwise within the
scope of acknowledged state power, not unreasonably or arbitrarily exercised,
cannot be condemned because it curtails the power of the individual to contract.
Id. at 157-58.
59 533 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 1988).
60 555 A.2d 21 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).
61 See Roe, 533 So. 2d at 280. In part, the insurance provision stated that "[i]f we
and a covered person do not agree [wjhether that person is legally entitled to recover
damages under this Part; or [] [a]s to the amount of damages; either party may make a
written demand for arbitration." Id. (alterations in original).
62 See id. Thus, both parties agreed to binding arbitration for an award up to $10,000
and to nonbinding arbitration for awards over $10,000. In this case, the arbitrators
awarded the insured $225,735, and the insurer sought relief in court. See id. at 280-81.
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and insured) were given the opportunity either to accept or reject the
provisions of the Florida Arbitration Code in deciding whether or not to
adopt an agreement to arbitrate disputes.63 In asserting that "arbitration is a
desirable option and should be encouraged," 64 the Florida Supreme Court in
Roe concluded that because both parties had initially agreed to the "escape
clause"65 provision of the policy, there existed no violation of public policy
inherent in the enforcement of the arbitration clause of the insurance policy.
In Cohen, the plaintiff brought an action to have an uninsured motorist
arbitration provision invalidated. 67 Again, similar to Reed, this provision
allowed either party to "demand the right to a trial' 68 if the arbitration award
had exceeded "the minimum limit for liability specified by the financial
responsibility law of New Jersey. '69 In Cohen, the plaintiff argued that the
provision allowing one party to "escape" from an arbitration award violated
both New Jersey statutory law70 and public policy.71 The Appellate Division
of the New Jersey Superior Court, rejected these contentions. It concluded
that the uninsured motorist arbitration provision originally was agreed to by
both parties, and that each party had the right to "stand upon the precise
terms of their contract, ' 72 without a court intervening to rewrite the contract
63 See id. at 281. Florida law provides that arbitration agreements "shall be valid,
enforceable, and irrevocable without regard to the justiciable character of the
controversy; provided that this act shall not apply to any such agreement or provision to
arbitrate in which it is stipulated that this law shall not apply or to any arbitration or
award thereunder." Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 682.02 (West 1990 & Supp. 2000)).
64 Id.
65 Typically, provisions in insurance policies, such as this one, in which one party
can unilaterally "reject" a particular arbitration award and seek relief in a court of law,
are referred to as "escape clauses." See id.
66 See id. Here, the court emphasized that both parties equally had the same
opportunity to reject an arbitration award that was over $10,000. In other words, the
insured would have had the same opportunity as the insurer to reject an award that he
found unsatisfactory, even if it was slightly over $10,000. See id.
67 See Cohen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 555 A.2d 21, 22 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).
68 Id.
69 Id. Here, the limit was $15,000 per person and $30,000 per accident. See id.
70 The plaintiff pointed to New Jersey law, which specifically sets the parameters for
the only situations in which a court may vacate an arbitration award. See id. at 22-23; see
also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24-8 (West 1987). In response to this, the court noted that,
"[e]nforcement of the policy provision does not involve judicial vacation of the
arbitration award; rather, it effectuates the presumed common intent of the parties that, in
certain circumstances, the award is to be of limited effect." Cohen, 555 A.2d at 22.
71 See Cohen, 555 A.2d at 22. The plaintiff argued that Allstate, the defendant
insurance company here, unconscionably benefited from this type of policy, which
represented a "contract of adhesion." See id. at 23.
72 Id. at 23.
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or amend the policy's scope of arbitration.73 Further, the court found that
there existed no concrete evidence in this case that showed that the uninsured
motorist policy unfairly advantaged the insurer to the detriment of the
insured.74
Schaefer v. Allstate Insurance Co.75 represents yet another case in which
an uninsured motorist policyholder brought an action to challenge the
policy's arbitration provision.76 In Schaefer, the Supreme Court of Ohio was
called upon to determine whether an uninsured motorist policy was
unconscionable and against public policy because it mandated binding
arbitration for parties on awards below a certain limit but allowed for
nonbinding arbitration in situations in which an award exceeded that limit.
77
Before getting to this question, the Ohio Supreme Court first grappled with
the definition of "arbitration" and concluded that in Ohio, "arbitration is
intended to be an alternative method of dispute resolution which is final (and
must be accorded finality) in all circumstances except those specifically set
forth in the statute.
' 78
In resolving the arbitration provision's allowance of both binding and
nonbinding arbitration the Schaefer court concluded that, depending on the
award of the arbitrator, the provisions of the uninsured motorist arbitration
73 See id. The court stated that "the ascertainable public policy here is to encourage
resort to arbitration while preserving full flexibility to the parties to elect or reject, and to
structure and limit, that process as they choose. The Allstate provision does not conflict
with that policy." Id.
74 See id. at 24. The court asserted that "[w]e cannot properly base a determination
of unconscionability on unsubstantiated impressions and personal intuition." Id.
75 63 Ohio St. 3d 708 (Ohio 1992).
7 6 See id. at 709-10.
7 7 See id. The policy in question in Schaefer was essentially the same as the one that
was at issue in Reed. Here, Ohio's financial responsibility law (requiring coverage of at
least $12,000 per person and $25,000 per accident) set the threshold limits between the
points at which binding and nonbinding arbitration would occur. See id. According to the
policy in question in Schaefer, if an arbitrator's award exceeded those limits, either party
could demand a trial de novo in a court of law. See id. at 716.
78Id. at 714 (citing Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2711.01 (West 1994)). The court
determined that the intention of the legislature was to give arbitration a "final and binding
effect." See id. The Schaefer court explained:
In R.C. Chapter 2711, the General Assembly has not only provided that agreements
to settle a controversy by arbitration are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, but that
a court may, upon motion, confirm an arbitrator's award and, thus, reduce the award
to judgment. Additionally, the General Assembly has provided that an arbitrator's
award may, upon motion, be modified, corrected, or vacated only under certain
conditions, which conditions represent the rarest of circumstances.
Id.
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policy were unenforceable, as they conflicted directly with Ohio law.79 Here,
the Supreme Court of Ohio felt that such an "escape hatch" that effectively
allowed one party to unilaterally "walk away" from an arbitrator's
determination defeated the intention of the legislature-to have arbitration be
final and binding, except in rare delineated circumstances, 80 which did not
apply to this situation.81
As in Reed, while it is true that some states have adopted statutes that
specifically mandate or approve of arbitration provisions contained in
uninsured motorist policies, several states also have promulgated statutes
restricting the use of arbitration in such uninsured motorist policies.83 In
84
some states, arbitration provisions are prohibited outright, in others, they
79 See supra note 78 and accompanying text. In fact, the Schaefer court never quite
reached plaintiff's assertion that the uninsured motorist arbitration provision was
unconscionable. See John P. Maxwell, A Quantum Leap Backwards: The Ohio Supreme
Court Constricts the Definition of "Arbitration" in Schaefer v. Allstate Insurance
Company, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 181, 182 (1993). Instead, the Ohio Supreme
Court took a "stab" at nonbinding arbitration, and disclaimed its existence as a legitimate
form of dispute resolution in the state of Ohio. See id. It is argued that the Schaefer court
"redefined the term 'arbitration' in such a limited way that the opinion will undoubtedly
have a chilling effect on the implementation of effective methods of alternative dispute
resolution in Ohio." Id. at 181.
80 In general, a court can vacate an arbitrator's otherwise binding decision if it is
determined that an award is "procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means," if there is
evidence that an arbitrator's partiality or misconduct prejudiced a party, or if an arbitrator
exceeded her power in a particular situation. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2711.10 (West
1994).
81 The Schaefer court expressed that:
[I]t is apparent that the insurance provision in question here represents a clear
attempt to bypass R.C. Chapter 2711 by setting up an "escape hatch" for any party
disappointed with an award exceeding a specified amount. In doing so, the provision
completely frustrates the purposes of "arbitration" and every public policy reason
favoring the arbitration system of dispute resolution. By permitting a trial de novo in
some instances, the provision unnecessarily subjects the parties to multiple
proceedings in a variety of forms, increases costs, extends the time consumed in
ultimately resolving a dispute, and eviscerates any advantage of unburdening
crowded court dockets. Accordingly, since the provision is not a provision for true
arbitration, the entire agreement to "arbitrate" clause is unenforceable.
Schaefer, 63 Ohio St. 3d at 716.
82 See WIDISS, supra note 1, § 23.12, at 242-44. Examples of these states include
California, Connecticut, Illinois, and Oregon. See id.
83 See id. § 23.4, at 216-19.
84 For example, in Tennessee it is stated that, "the uninsured motorist provision shall
not require arbitration of any claim arising hereunder . I.." d. at 218. Likewise, in West
Virginia, it is stated that, "[n]o such (uninsured motorist) endorsement or provisions shall
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are optional, 5 and in some states, arbitration provisions are contingent on the
insured party being able to request a review by a court if they are not
satisfied with the outcome of the arbitration. 6
In some situations, the enforceability of arbitration provisions in
uninsured motorist policies can be affected by its characterization as a
"contract of adhesion."87 For example, in Cohen, the plaintiff unsuccessfully
argued that the insurance company unconscionably benefited from the
arbitration provisions of the uninsured motorist policy, which represented a
contract of adhesion.88 With respect to contracts of adhesion, some state
statutory schemes that approve of the use of arbitration, provided for in
written contracts to resolve disputes, state that the arbitration is "valid,
enforceable and irrevocable"89 unless the provision is a contract of
adhesion.90 While some take the view that uninsured motorist coverage that
is characterized as "adhesive" should not have an effect on the enforceability
of arbitration provisions,91 the argument can be made that such adhesion
contracts have fundamentally detrimental effects on the insured to the benefit
of the insurer.
92
contain any provision requiring arbitration of any claim arising under any such
endorsement or provisions . . . ." Id.
85 In Kansas it is established that "[tihe insured shall not be required to arbitrate
disputed claims except as to determination of amount of loss." Id. at 216 (emphasis
added). Further, in Louisiana, it is stated that:
The coverage ... may include provisions for the submission of claims by the insured
to arbitration; provided, however, that the submission to arbitration shall be optional
with the assured, shall not deprive the assured of his right to bring action against the
insurer to recover any sums to him under the terms of the policy, and shall not
purport to deprive the courts of the state of jurisdiction of actions against the insurer.
Id. at 217.
86 See id. at 216. Such is the case in Nevada, where it is stated that "[n]o provision
for arbitration contained in an automobile liability or motor vehicle liability insurance
policy delivered, issued for delivery or renewed in this state after the effective date of this
act is binding upon the named insured or any other claiming under the policy." Id. at 217.
Similarly, in Arkansas, it is established that, "[n]o insurance policy ... shall contain any
condition, provision or agreement which directly or indirectly deprive the insured ... of
the right to trial by jury or any question of fact arising under such policy...; (b) all such
provisions.. .shall be void." Id. at 218.
87 See id. § 23.7, at 228.
88 See supra note 71.
89 See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7303 (West 1998).
90 See WIDISS, supra note 1, § 23.7, at 231.
91 See id. at 230.
9 2 See id. at 229. Typically, arbitration provisions in insurance contracts are
contained in very complicated and lengthy documents, which the policyholder may not
get to review until several days or weeks after the insurance policy has already been
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As can be seen by this split of jurisdictions on the use and feasibility of
arbitration with respect to uninsured motorist policies, there is currently no
definitive answer on this issue, with each situation being evaluated on a case-
by-case basis in each respective state. It is the author's contention that the
use of arbitration to resolve disputes that arise in the uninsured motorist
context is highly beneficial to both parties.93 However, the author does find
disfavor with certain arbitration provisions such as the one at issue in Reed
that allow one party unilaterally to use an "escape hatch" to reject a high
award and seek review in a court of law, but that binds both parties to a lower
award. In the majority of cases, the one appealing a high award will be most
likely the insurer rather than the insured.94 Thus, such an escape clause
provision acts unfairly to advantage the insurer to the detriment of the
insured.
It is the author's belief that pursuant to statute, arbitration provisions
contained in uninsured motorist policies should state that arbitration awards
will be binding only on the insurer, with the insured party being able either to
accept the award or to be allowed to seek review of the award in a court of
law. This setup, which, as outlined above, has been approved for use in some
states, would help to alleviate the effects of the adhesive nature of an
uninsured motorist policy and would bring the policyholder onto a more even
playing ground in his dealings with a particular insurance company.
V. CONCLUSION
Arbitration is certainly considered a respected form of alternative dispute
resolution in many jurisdictions throughout the United States.95 In the
uninsured motorist arena, the use of arbitration is generally a very popular
mechanism among states, courts, and insurance companies for resolving
purchased. See id. In Popskyj v. Keystone Insurance Company, 565 A.2d 1184, 1197 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1989) (Del Sole, J., dissenting), it was stated that "[s]ince it has been
recognized that insurance contracts are typically contracts of "adhesion," there is no
question that Appellant was not in a position to make a "meaningful choice" whether he
should accept this arbitration provision." Id.
93 In general, compared to traditional forms of litigation, arbitration allows for a
quick determination of disputes, it is less expensive in resolving disputes (no attorney's
fees or overhead costs), it tends to provide more stable awards, and it alleviates court
congestion. See generally Recent Case, 78 HARV. L. REV 1250 (1964).
94 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
95 As was so eloquently stated in Mayflower Insurance Co. v. Pellegrino, 212 Cal.
App. 3d 1326, 1334 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989): "There is a strong public policy favoring
arbitration as an expeditious and economical means of dispute resolution." Id.
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disputes pertaining to coverage and compensation issues.96 However, the
future of arbitration provisions in uninsured motorist policies that provide for
an "escape hatch," allowing one party unilaterally to seek review of an
arbitration award, is currently uncertain. In Reed, this form of nonbinding
arbitration was approved for use by the Supreme Court of Illinois, which
determined that such a use did not violate public policy or impinge on any
constitutional rights. However, some courts have called into question this
hybrid use of arbitration, as was the case in Schaefer.
Once again, although the law on this matter may be quite settled in the
state of Illinois and in other jurisdictions which have been confronted with
determining what the proper use of arbitration is in the uninsured motorist
context, if any, there exists no clear uniform standard that controls in a given
situation. Until the United States Supreme Court takes on this issue,9 7 if ever,
we may just have to live with the varying standards that currently exist in
jurisdictions throughout the United States on this very complex and
controversial issue.
Mark Arthur Saltzman
96 In the uninsured motorist context, for example, "the insured usually can obtain an
arbitration hearing date much earlier than a court date. In addition to being speedier,
arbitration is usually more cost-efficient and informal. Experience indicated that insureds,
as a whole, may do better, in terms of net recovery, in arbitration than in court." William
A. Mayhew, Bad Faith and the Uninsured Motorist Claim, 19 FORUM 618, 618 (1984).
97 Of course, issues pertaining to automobile insurance in the United States
primarily are considered traditional state concerns, but the U.S. Supreme Court certainly
would have the final say on such issues from a federal constitutional perspective.

